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I. Introduction 
* WEST AFRICA 
by John R. Harris 
In recent discussions of development and inequality in 
Africa, at least three positions can be identified concerning 
relationships between rural-urban migration and inequality. 
The most simplistic and journalistic view is that mi-
grants come to the cities only to find unemployment and 
miserable living conditions. The story, as usually depicted, 
identifies the problem as misguided persistence in migrating 
explanations based on the inappropriateness of educational 
curricula, lures of brights lights, and misinformation. De-
spite little evidence to support this view, many African 
politicians have identified persistent migration as the 
cause of urban poverty and have attempted to stop the flow 
of migrants through exhortation, administrative controls, and 
coercion. Actions seem to have been based on the notion that 
the problems of urban poverty will disappear if only the poor 
* 
An earlier version of this paper was presented- at the 
International Conference on the Economic Development of Sahel-
ian Countries, Montreal, October 13-14, 1977. 
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stay away. Although it is seldom stated explicitly, there 
seems to be a hope that migrants would readily find appropri-
ate opportunities if only they would remain in the rural 
areas. 
A second view is that migration reflects, rather than 
causes, great inequalities in job opportunities and amenities 
between rural and urban areas. If most migration is sensible 
from the standpoint of migrants, and most migrants, even 
though poor, are somewhat better off than they would be had 
they not migrated, it follows that observed in~quality in the 
growing areas must be attacked through improving opportunities 
at the source through accelerated development in backward re-
gions. The tacit assumption is that inequalities should be 
reduced in the development process and that policy will be so 
directed. 
Finally, there is a ''radical'' view best expounded by 
Samir Amin and Joel Gregory that inequalities are a funda-
mental part of capitalist development, that at least some 
migration is a response to such inequalities, but that what-
ever improvement migrants achieve is slight and that the 
consequence is that fundamental demands for structural change 
Of course each of these ''positions'' is a caricature of 
views held by particular observers. Yet it seems useful to 
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identify these positions in order to set a framework for look-
ing at the relationships between migration, regional labor 
markets, and inequality. The thrust of the argument to be de-
veloped is that migration in West Africa is in fact a rational, 
individual response to unequal opportunities, that to some 
extent such migration reduces the degree of inequality in the 
economy as a whole, but that insufficient attention has been 
paid to operational definition and identification of conse-
quences of migration for inequality in a dynamic context. 
The problem is thrown into sharp relief in the case of 
the Sahel. Relative stagnation, punctuated by disasters, best 
characterizes the performance of these economies in recent 
years. But the Sahelian populations have been among the most 
mobile in the world and migration, particularly to the coastal 
economies, has been a strong response. However, the response 
has varied among Sahelian countries with the movements from 
Upper Volta to the Ivory Coast and Ghana the largest, move-
ments from Niger to Nigeria and Cameroun smaller, and rela-
tively little migration from the poorest Sahelian count~y of 
all, Chad. 
Whether these large-scale movements have been a partial 
solution to the problems of development in such a fragile 
environment, or whether they have prevented "genuine" develop-
ment from occurring remain hotly debated. Even more important 
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for the future will be the policy decisions reflecting long-
term strategies for development of the Sahel. On the one 
hand, efforts may be concentrated on developing relatively 
self-sufficient economies based on the rural potential of the 
region. On the other hand, greater integration with coastal 
economies could be sought to increase the specialization and 
trade between the two zones as well as to encourage even 
greater labor mobility within the region so that Sahelian 
peoproes will be able to move easily to better-endowed areas. 
Even in the context of relatively market-oriented strat-
egies, one can contrast the European case in which labor from 
the Mediterranean basin has been drawn into the industrialized 
economies in response to labor shortages with the Japanese ex-
perience in which the response to labor shortage has been to 
transfer investment to Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, the Philip-
pines, and Indonesia. The former would correspond to increased 
concentration of development in the coastal economies -- the 
latter would correspond to greater industrial dispersion 
within the region. 
Among the unanswered questions concerning the relative 
merits of these two alternatives is whether the labor force 
would be sufficiently mobile to adapt to either strategy, 
what would be the effects on real incomes for the respective 
populations, and how would further development be affected by 
the strategy followed. 
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II. Determinants of Migration 
Setting aside the important category of population move-
ments that arise from political upheaval, war, famine, and 
the like, a tten:t:[ic:,n wi 11 be directed to the migration that 
is "voluntary." The economic theory of migration (reflected 
in Harris and Todaro, Harris and Sabot) takes as a point of 
departure that differential earnings opportunities exist in 
various sectors and regions of an economy. Migration is then 
observed as a response of individuals and families to per-
ceived opportunities. The central point in the analysis by 
Harris and Todaro is that individuals are aware both of levels 
of earnings that they may enjoy if employed and also of prob-
abilities of actually finding employment. Therefore, it may be 
quite rational for individuals to migrate in the hope of find-
ing a well-paying job even though the risk of being unemployed 
is considerable. Gugler has described this process as playing 
a job lottery, which is an excellent way of portraying the 
process. It is to be noted that the villain of the piece giv-
ing rise to substantial urban unemployment is the relatively 
high level of wages in the modern sector. The implication is 
that with less inequality in earnings levels, total migration 
flows would be lower, unemployment would be lower, production 
would be higher, and the distribution of earnings would be 
somewhat more equal. And it is behavior of the government 
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and large~scale sector in setting a relatively high wage 
level that both creates and perpetuates inefficient use of 
resources and increased inequality. In that analysis, which 
is also the basic framework underlying the ILO report on 
Kenya, institutional features are responsible for inequality 
which arises from the ability of organized workers to back 
their claims by effective political action and alliance with 
the civil service which also desires higher salaries and 
privileges. 
It should be clear that this analysis views migration 
as a response to inequality and sees specific institutions 
as responsible for perpetrating higher degrees of inequality 
than are "necessary" for the functioning of a market-oriented 
economy. 
In the more recent analysis of Harris and Sabot, it is 
pointed out that migration in the face of unemployment re-
quires a process of search to find a job and that people who 
search long enough are eventually rewarded. A critical feature 
to be observed is that unemployed persons have to survive in 
some manner or other and, in Africa, are in fact heavily 
reliant upon support from already-employed friends and rela-
tives. Extended family systems redistribute substantial 
amounts of the unequal earnings and in so doing provide a 
mechanism whereby persons with greater ':r,esources will refrain 
from accepting the first job that comes along in order to 
search further for better opportunities. 
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It is clear that individualist models cast in a dualistic 
framework are much too simple to capture West African reality. 
However, it is conceptually straightforward to focus the anal-
ysis on decision-making units whether they be families, ex-
tended families, or other social groups. Such social units 
have available to them certain resources, primarily the poten-
tial labor and skills of the unit plus access to land, credit, 
existing capital, technica 1 knowledge, and "contacts." There 
is no space here to expand on the wide range of economic and 
social resources that may be mobilized by such decision-making 
units. The problem that is then faced is how best to allocate 
those resources among the various opportunities known and 
available to the unit. Here Hart has made an excellent contri-
bution in outlining the wide range of opportunities faced by 
Ghanaian families, a range that goes far beyond simple dual-
istic models. The theory that emerges from this framework is 
that West African decision-making units act in their per-
ceived self~interest in allocating their resources among the 
opportunities. In the West African context, these decisions 
frequently involve migration, of short or long duration, as 
part of the "solution." It follows that the more unequally 
distributed over space are the opportunities, the more likely 
will migration, in some form, be an appropriate response. 
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III. Evidence from Africa 
The evidence is quite unambiguous that people who are 
able to search longer end up finding better jobs, which is 
consistent with the observation that people with greater 
levels of education tend to remain unemployed for longer 
periods while they wait to find a "suitable" job. Further-
more, when people are unsuccessful in finding a suitable job, 
their expectations about what they should be able to get are 
revised downward. This was evident in Nigeria in the early 
sixties when primary school leavers ceased looking for cleri-
cal jobs and began entering apprenticeships in great numbers. 
Therefore, while it is true that continuing rural-urban mi-
gration contributes to unemployment, it is also clear that a 
great deal of this unemployment is in fact confined to an 
initial period of extended job search. Rempel demonstrates 
that in Kenya the longer people stay in urban areas, the 
higher are their incomes. These increases in income result 
from less open unemployment, from transition out of self-
employment into wage employment, and of enhanced earnings as 
people stay for extended periods within a particular sector. 
There is abundant anecdotal evidence, and a small amount of 
hard evidence, suggesting that people who are unsuccessful 
in obtaining urban employment return home after some time. 
Barnum and Sabot demonstrate convincingly that as the 
supply of more educated workers increased over time in 
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Tanzania, the propensity of the more educated to migrate to 
urban areas remained high and even increased while the pro-
pensity of those with little education to move to urban areas 
has decreased sharply in recent years. In earlier periods, 
the less educated were able to compete for urban jobs since 
there were few educated competitors for those openings. How-
ever, as the supply of educated personnel has increased, 
they have ceased to find sufficient job opportunities at the 
levels that had prevailed earlier, and have begun to compete 
for lower-}evel jobs. Employers tend to use education as a 
screening device and hire those with more education in pref-
erence to those with less. Therefore, over time, the apparent 
educational requirements or qualifications for filling parti-
cular jobs has increased and there has been a "filtering down" 
in the labor market by the educated with subsequent displace-
ment of those who are less "qualified." The fact that the less 
educated have responded to this situation by showing a de-
creasing propensity to migrate bears evidence to the fact 
that they are indeed sensitive to availability of opportuF.-
nities, have adjusted their expectations accordingly, and 
have in fact been willing to stay in the countryside when 
attractive urban opportunities no longer remain open. 
Peter Lloyd provides an excellent summary of the find-
ings concerning success, satisfactions, and aspirations of 
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urban slum dwellers. There is, therefore, no need to repeat 
his analysis, but merely to reinforce his conclusion that 
the vast majority of migrants to urban areas believe that 
they have bettered their lot and enhanced the opportunities 
for their children. Furthermore, extended family, ethnic, 
and friendship networks are important and strong and there 
is little evidence that large segments of the urban popula-
tion are "permanently cut off from the roots." Byerlee and 
Eicher, in reviewing the literature on African migration in 
their 1972 survey, provided support for the above statements 
which have been further reinforced by more recent work. 
Let me try to recapitulate concisely the African evi-
dence. Migration has been a response to opportunities result-
ing from development, a response to unequal opportunities 
arising in different regions. Most individuals or families 
that have migrated feel that they have, in fact, achieved a 
degree of improvement in their situation as a result of mi-
gration. Furthermore, there is considerable suggestion of 
fluidity and mobility within the social structures, of ex-
tended family and friendship networks providing a substantial 
degree of income redistribution, which means that realized 
levels of living are less unequal than the distribution of 
earnings would first,Jindicate. 
However, it is not clear at this date whether these 
semi-traditional systems of redistribution are breaking down. 
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The degree to which these networks cut across "class "lines, 
and particularly the degree to which education and parents 
income status are related are not well known. It is quite 
possible that the social systems will break down under the 
weight of changing economic interests and self-definition 
of classes. However, hard evidence that this is in fact 
occurring is not abundant, assertions to the contrary not-
withstanding. 
At the present state of knowledge, we can say only that 
there is considerable inequality of earnings in most African 
countries. While many experienced observers believe that in-
equality is increasing in most African countries, the evi~ 
dence is not clear-cut. It also seems true that private re-
distribution serves to make consumption levels much less 
unequal than earnings. Furthermore, there is considerable. 
reason to believe that if we look at life-time earnings, 
there is less inequality than would appear in any static 
analysis. 
From this I conclude that migration is a response to 
underlying inequalities and not their principal cause. There 
is also reason to believe that the degree of success actually 
achieved by migrants has made them less ready to challenge 
the status quo and to demand major structural reform. Again, 
this is a subject that Peter Lloyd has dealt with elegantly, 
and I wish only to indicate my strong agreement with him. 
Unfortunately, there is no comparable paper dealing specif-
ically with migrants from the Sahel although fragmentary 
evidence provided by Goddard and Hart are not inconsistent. 
IV. The Meaning and Measurement of Inequality 
That inequality exists in Africa is unquestionable. 
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That in some important sense it is increasing is also a widelcy 
accepted belief. Yet despite the tremendous amount of discus-
sion on the subject in recent years, the coneept of inequality 
remains ill-defined and even less measured. Whereas it is not 
surprising that this basic lack of conceptual definition and 
empirical evidence has not in any way impeded the making of 
pronouncements, it may be useful to d~gress for a few moments 
to think about the problem. 
In the past few years, economists have come to talk much 
more about problems of income distribution and a number of 
attempts have been made to provide measures of equality and 
inequality in specific economies. Most recently, this work 
has been taken up with great energy by the World Bank, and 
a number of papers have come out from that institution. In 
particular Ahluwalia and others have been collecting system-
atic data on income distribution and a recent volume written 
by Jain has been published. It is fair to say that no strong 
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conclusions have yet emerged from these data because of 
serious conceptual and empirical problems. Two of the more 
notable recent attempts have been that of Chenery and col-
leagues and of Adleman and Morris in trying to relate chang-
ing income distributions with the development process. 
At least part of the problem is that the scanty and 
hardly reliable data that are available relate only to static 
measures of distribution of money income at particular points 
in time. Whether one uses summary measures such as gini co-
efficients, or shares of income going to particular percentile 
groups of the population, snapshot views of inequality can be 
misleading. This is particularly trge in the case of Africa 
where substantial amounts of real goods and services are 
produced outside the monetized sectors and are therefore 
usually under-enumerated if not forgotten. Second, most in-
come data are recorded by the recipients of income rather 
than the users of income which may be misleading when private 
redistribution systems, such as extended families, break the 
tight link between income earned in the market place and 
consumption realized. Finally, and perhaps most important, 
it is now well known from analysing income distributions in 
Western countries that important life-cycle phenomena are 
masked by the data. In particular, new entrants and retired 
members of the labor force usually are seen to be earning 
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low levels of income. Highest incomes accrue to people who 
are in their middle to late earning years. Thus, the picture 
that one gets in looking at the distribution of income at 
any moment in time fails to reflect the fact that individuals 
over their lifetime will earn fluctuating incomes. It is 
widely known that the distribution of lifetime earnings are 
less equally distributed than are earnings at any particular 
point in time. I am aware of no successful attempt to come to 
grips with these issues in an African context. 
A more realistic approach might be to examine the earn-
ing patterns of particular age cohorts. It may well be that 
one of the greatest sources of inequality in the African con-
text is between younger and older generations, a difference 
that is partly related to migration to urban areas. Although 
there may be great inequality within urban areas in African 
countries, the measure of gross inequality is usually great-
est between rural and urban areas where income differentials 
are of a factor of four or five. Yet, there is a possibility 
that the transfer of younger generations from lower £0 higher 
income positions, while exacerbating income differentials in 
the short run, may, in fact, be leading to greater equality 
in the longer run. I would not be so foolish as to assert 
that this is the .case but neither would I argue with confi-
dence that is is false. We need more research addressed spe-
cifically to this question. 
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A second problem is the amount of inequality in income 
contributed by geographic or regional differences in levels 
of development. Even where such data do exist, the whole web 
of interregional remittances and investment flows is system-
atically missed. We are unable to identify regional origins 
of income earners in the higher-income, rapidly-growing areas. 
Returning again to the conceptual level, it has been 
common in the West to talk about equality of opportunity as 
opposed to equality of outcome. Again, I am not asserting 
that equality of opportunity exists in Africa, yet it is 
quite possible that one would find less variation in oppor-
tunities than it appears in actual earnings. This is parti-
cularly true where periodic bouts of unemployment are common; 
at any moment of time one will find some individuals who have 
found regular employment and others who have not yet succeeded. 
Yet both the successful and unsuccessful may face relatively 
equal opportunities and, over time, may have experiences less 
divergent than the observations at any moment would suggest. 
Without attempting to solve these knotty conceptual 
problems, I would at least plead for people to spend more time 
thinking about the nature, extent, and measurement of inequal-
ity when addressing the problem. Only in the short run can 
rhetoric substitute for analysis and fact; we are far from 
knowing the facts at the moment, and the lack of conceptual 
clarity impedes collection of better information. 
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V. Migration and Regional Inequality 
Einally, let me turn to the larger question of the degree 
to which migration has in fact perpetrated further inequality. 
Amin has argued that "no single region of emigration has ever 
developed either in Africa or elsewhere. The transfer--which 
is more than considerable--is virtually a 'gift' from the poor 
source areas to the rich areas which benefit from it and this 
is sufficient in itself to explain the stagnation of the re-
gions of origin of the migrants. And, because of their stag-
nation, the conditions for the repr,oduction of the pattern of 
unequal development are perpetuated; because inequality in the 
'allocation of factors,' far from being 'natural,' is produced 
and reproduced socially"(p. 106). Obviously such a sweeping 
statement is historically unsupportable--Sweden provides one 
obvious counterexample, while the Eastern region of Nigeria, 
as documented by Green, provides another. Furthermore, one 
must be careful not to confuse place well-being with people 
well-being--although until very recently Scotland has been a 
relatively backward regional economy, the Scots as a group of 
people have done reasonably well. Goddard has shown nicely in 
his paper on Northern Nigeria the ways in which families from 
areas with different opportunities combine farming and seas-
onal migration in different proportions to increase their in-
comes. Migration provides superior alternatives for those who 
come from areas less well serviced by roads and proximity 
to major centers. 
We do know from Johnson and Whitelaw, among others, 
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that savings rates of urban migrants in East Africa are rela-
tively high and that their propensity to remit funds to home 
areas is extremely high. Beyerlee, Tommy, and Fatoo find 
generally similar results in Sierra Leone. And there are scat~ 
tered bits of evidence suggesting that migrants remit to home 
areas for the purpose of educating children and making invest-
ments in rural areas where this appears profitable, whereas 
people coming from districts with little potential or poor 
opportunities for investment tend to seek outlets for their 
savings in urban-based activities such as trading, ren~al 
housing, and the like. Much less is known in this respect 
concerning migrants from the Sahel. 
The issue of whether migration robs an area of resources 
when people leave therefore depends a great deal on the po-
tential of the area. Nevertheless, th4s establishes a pre-
sumption that migration from relatively well-off_areas will 
result in further investment being generated through remitted 
urban earnings, whereas people will permanently leave the 
less-developed regions. However, before one starts to decry 
this process, one has to ask what would be the effects of 
trying to use scarce resources in the less-developed regions. 
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It is possible that residents of those backward regions will 
be better off as a result of transferring substantial parts 
of their population to more dynamic areas in which risks are 
substantially reduced. There is no logical imperative that 
all regions should be developed equally, since we are presum-
ably interested in what happens to the distribution of income 
among people. As Alonso has pointed out, there need be no 
correlation between equality among average regional incomes 
and equality in the distribution of personal income. 
To take another case, Stolper has shown that the rela-
tively unequal distribution of income in the Ivory Coast is 
accounted for largely by a disproportionate number of migrants 
from Upper Volta and other Sahelian countries that form the 
high tail. The distribution of income among Ivorians is in 
fact surprisingly equal. At the same time, the relatively 
low earnings of Voltaics in the Ivory Coast appear to be con-
siderably higher than they could possibly earn if they had 
remained in Upper Volta. And it is quite unambiguous that 
opportunities to migrate have been important for the survi-
val of large parts of the Sahelian population during the 
period of the Sahelian drought. It seems highly unlikely that 
the real income of Upper Volta would have been higher and the 
distribution less unequal than they would have been in the 
absence of outmigration. At the same time, the presence of 
Voltaics in the Ivory Coast allows an economic structure 
that generates relatively unequal incomes overall but in 
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fact provides relatively equal and high incomes for Ivorians. 
This demonstrates the complicated relationships between the 
equality or inequality of regional and personal incomes and 
the process of migration. 
Although these cases demonstrate the complexity of the 
problem, it remains clear that our knowledge of the conse-
quences of migration, particularly how migration may perpet-
uate and intensify patterns of unequal development, remains 
very limited. 
VI. Conclusions 
I have argued that migration from rural to urban areas 
in Africa has been a response to considerable inequalities 
in income-earning opportunities. In part this inequality has 
resulted from specific policy interventions designed to pro-
tect politically powerful groups in a context of foreign-
oriented economies. While there is overwhelming evidence 
that most migrants believe that they have bettered their 
situation, it is difficult to demonstrate convincingly that 
thete would have been less inequality in the absence of 
such migration. 
To some extent, the apparent degree of success felt to 
have been achieved by the majority of migrants may have 
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defused some of their discontent, thereby restraining 
effective demands that would have brought about fundamental 
structural change. However, I have not yet seen evidence 
that demonstrates the validity of this contention. It seems 
clear that had African economies developed in ways that pro-
vided more equal opportunities, there would have been some-
what less migration and more efficient use of labor. But it 
is also true that if we look at the dynamic patterns of in-
come generation over a person's and family's lifetimes, the 
degree of inequality that we see at any given time is prob-
ably exaggerated. While the~ priori case that internal 
mechanisms for redistribution are withering in the face of 
class formation and consolidation, understanding of the way 
these interests become articulated is minimal. Existing con-
ceptualization and measurement techniques are wholly inade-
quate for examining inequality in a dynamic framework. 
The existing evidence makes it abundantly clear that 
West African populations are highly mobile and responsive 
to new economic opportunities. I am not aware of any docu-
mented case of viable opportunities remaining unexploited 
for lack of a labor force. At the same time, it is clear 
that some groups have been bypassed, having participated 
only minimally in the opportunities that have -a~-vel()ped. 
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Therefore, attention must be diverted to understanding 
how economic growth and development can best be fostered in 
order to benefit the Sahelian populations. Whether equity-
oriented development is more feasible under relatively self-
sufficient rural-based strategies for Sahelian countries 
(as argued by Amin and Gregory) or by greater integration 
with the coastal countries remains an open question. Analysis 
of the alternatives is difficult and largely uncharted b~t 
deserving of high priority. In addressing this task it will 
be crucial to avoid confusing people welfare with place 
welfare. We are interested in the well 7 being of Sahelian 
peoples--hence the focus of attention must be on GNP--not 
GDP. 
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